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Abstract: This paper presents a rational political budget cycle
model for the open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in
the run-up to elections, in order to increase the electoral
chances of the party in office. By concentrating on the closed
economy, previous political cycle models had overlooked the
influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates.
We introduce voter uncertainty in two different dimensions.
Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the
incumbent. They also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is
opportunistic, i.e. willing to distort the economy for electoral
gain. When there is only uncertainty about competence, we obtain
a separating equilibrium, like in the previous political budget
cycle literature. However, when uncertainty about opportunism is
introduced, a partially pooling equilibrium emerges: an
incompetent, opportunistic incumbent delays a devaluation until
after elections, mimicking a competent incumbent, while the
competent does not distort the optimal pattern of the exchange
rate, regardless of the degree of opportunism.
The model’s prediction that there is a tendency to delay
devaluations until after elections is used to look at the
empirical evidence on devaluations around elections.
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Elections and the timing of devaluations
**
Ernesto H. Stein and Jorge M. Streb
I.  Introduction
It has long been recognized that devaluations are
politically sensitive events. In a classic paper, Cooper (1971)
pointed out that devaluations in developing countries impose
sizable political costs on finance ministers, who tend to leave
shortly after the devaluation takes place. In addition, on
occasions devaluations have led to the fall of the government.
To the extent that devaluations impose significant political
costs, these costs should affect the government’s incentives
regarding the timing of exchange rate adjustments. In particular,
we expect that governments will try to avoid devaluations in the
run-up to elections, and will postpone corrections until
elections have taken place. In this paper, we present a political
economy model consistent with this pattern.
There are plenty of episodes in which devaluations required
to correct exchange rate misalignments have been postponed, in an
effort to help the electoral chances of the party in office.
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Among the episodes that motivate our ideas on the political
manipulation of exchange rates are the 1986 Cruzado Plan in
Brazil, the failed 1989 Primavera Plan in Argentina, and the 1994
Mexican Peso crisis.
In the Cruzado plan, the exchange rate was pegged despite
mounting current account deficits. Cardoso (1991) stressed that
“another election loomed, and, in the best Brazilian political
tradition, corrective actions were placed on hold. This time the
new measures (i.e., the devaluation) were announced immediately
after the (legislative) elections”. The main element of the
Primavera plan was the reduction of the rate of crawl, widely
interpreted as an attempt to moderate inflation in the run-up to
the 1989 presidential elections (Heymann, 1991). However, a
speculative attack, amidst the suspension of external financing,
led to a sharp devaluation that ended the stabilization attempt
before the elections, with disastrous electoral results for the
ruling party.
The 1994 Mexican Peso crisis is a recent and much discussed
example of waiting until after an election to correct an
overvaluation. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) note, the skepticism
over exchange rate commitments prevailing in Mexico in 1994 was
compounded by the government’s previous track record of devaluing
in presidential election years. As we point out here, the3
government’s temptation to devalue has a precise timing: after
the elections.
1
Complementing this evidence at an episodic level, there are
more systematic studies that support this pattern. Edwards (1993)
studies the timing of 39 large devaluations (15% or more) in
democratic regimes, and finds that they tend to occur early on in
the term. Gavin and Perotti (1997) include in a recent study of
fiscal policy in Latin America a section on the determinants of
shifts in exchange rate regimes from fixed to flexible. They find
that the likelihood that such a shift will occur increases
significantly right after an election has taken place.
Klein and Marion (1994) study the duration of exchange rate
pegs to the US dollar for a sample of 17 Latin American countries
in the 1956-1991 period. In contrast to Gavin and Perotti, who
focus only on regime shifts, these authors consider step
devaluations as the end of a spell and the beginning of another.
They find that the likelihood a peg will be abandoned increases
immediately after an executive transfer.
Although the evidence on the relationship between elections
and the timing of devaluations is still scant, it appears to
support the hypothesis that devaluations tend to be delayed until
                    
1 This phenomenon is obviously not limited to Latin American
economies. In the case of Israel, for example, Ben-Porath (1975)
stresses that the closest a devaluation ever came to preceding an
election was eighteen months, suggesting that devaluations are
avoided in the run-up to elections.4
after elections. There is, however, no theoretical model
consistent with this pattern. In this paper, we develop a
political cycle model to explain the temptation of the government
to manipulate exchange rate policy for political purposes. In
addition, we provide new empirical evidence on the relationship
between elections and the timing of devaluations.
The traditional political business cycle model, due to
Nordhaus (1975), assumes backward-looking voters. Rogoff and
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990),
however, obtain political cycles even in the presence of forward-
looking voters, as a result of a signaling game between voters
and the government, in the presence of incomplete information on
the degree of competence of the incumbent.
In Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), the signaling
game is not cast in terms of a political business cycle, where
current employment can be boosted through expansionary aggregate
demand policies, at the cost of higher inflation later on.
Rather, they stress a political budget cycle where visible taxes
are lowered, and visible expenditures are raised, before
elections. The existence of political budget cycles had been
pointed out by Tufte (1978), with data from the U.S. and Europe,
and Ames (1987) found a similar pattern in Latin America.
Our model applies the rational political budget cycle
approach to exchange rates. It extends Stein and Streb (1998),5
which models electoral cycles in an open economy to explain the
timing of price stabilizations around elections.
The model has three distinctive features. First, the costs
of inflation and devaluation are derived from microfoundations,
in a model with a cash-in-advance constraint, where inflation
acts as a tax on consumption. The key trade-off is between
inflation today and inflation tomorrow, which amounts to giving
the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace
(1981) a political economy rationale.
Second, we consider an open economy where inflation and
devaluation are identical, so the model is interpreted in terms
of its implications for nominal exchange rates. The pattern of
devaluations around elections is seen as a political budget
cycle, a feature overlooked in conventional stories that
concentrate on a closed economy.
The third feature is the basic analytical innovation. The
typical assumption in political budget cycle models is that
governments share the utility function of voters, but derive
additional utility from being in office, which may lead to
opportunistic behavior. The only informational asymmetry regards
the degree of competence of the government. We introduce a second
dimension over which there is incomplete information: voters do6
not know whether the incumbent is opportunistic or not. This two-
dimensional incomplete information has important implications.
2
Asymmetric information regarding opportunism can change the
nature of the equilibrium in the signaling game, moving it away
from a separating equilibrium to a partially pooling equilibrium.
Incidentally, we also move away from an implication of previous
rational political cycle models, which we do not find
particularly attractive: that, in equilibrium, only the competent
government manipulates economic policy to signal competency,
while the incompetent simply reveals its incompetence and loses
the elections.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section Two introduces
the economic model, with a cash-in-advance constraint that makes
nominal devaluations a form of distortionary taxation. Section
Three studies what happens with the economy once a political
system is introduced, in an incomplete information setup where
voters are uncertain about how competent and how opportunistic
politicians are. Section Four looks at the empirical implications
of the model, and how it relates to evidence on elections and the
                    
2 These twin dimensions of competence and opportunism relate to
Covey et al. (1995), p. 240-1, who emphasize the importance of
both competence and character. Taking the case of a doctor, they
remark that we require a doctor to be both competent (to make the
right diagnosis and prescribe the right therapy) and honest (to
not submit you to a surgery you don’t need). Weinschelbaum (1998)
also introduces two-dimensional incomplete information, in a
principal-agent model of corruption where purchase costs can be
low or high and the honesty of the procurement manager varies.7
timing of devaluations drawn from Latin-American countries.
Section Five presents the conclusions and the extensions for
future work.
II. The economic model: devaluations as distortionary taxation
We work with a two-period model for a small open economy. A
key feature of the model is a cash-in-advance constraint, by
which agents need to hold money in order to consume. The
opportunity cost of holding money is given by the nominal
interest rate. In the context of our model, inflation and
devaluation are equivalent, and thus devaluation, through its
effect on the nominal interest rate, acts as a tax on
consumption. A key trade-off in the model is that between present
and future devaluation. After deriving this trade-off in Section
Two, the political economy model of Section Three will show that,
under asymmetric information, the incumbent government may have
incentives to exploit this trade-off for political purposes.
Preferences, technology and financial assets
There is a private tradable good, yct, and a public good,
ygt. These goods are non-storable. The government supplies a
constant amount g of the public good each period. By the law of
one price, the domestic price of the private good depends on the
nominal exchange rate et and on the international price p*ct,
which we assume constant.
*
c t ct p e p ”  (1)8
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by a
constant relative risk aversion utility function, where CRRA
r‡1.












Labor is the only factor of production, and its supply is
inelastic.
4 The production functions are linear in private and
government employment, lct and lgt, respectively.
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A Central Bank issues fiat money Mt, which has no nominal
return. In addition to money, agents can hold bonds Bt, which are
indexed to the exchange rate, so they bear no devaluation risk.
The nominal return to bonds, it, is determined by the rate of
devaluation et”(et-et-1)/et-1 and by the constant external interest
rate r
*.
                    
3 For r=1,u(ct)=ln ct; for r>1, u(ct)=ct
1-r/(1-r). The degree of
risk aversion is typically greater than in log function. Reinhart
and Végh (1994), for instance, report that most estimates of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (the inverse of the
relative rate of risk aversion) are significantly different from
zero, but below 0.80, so r>1/0.8.
4 Labor supply is inelastic at l, and supply of the public good
is constant at g, so neither enters explicitly into the utility
function.9
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Cash in advance and budget constraints
By a cash-in-advance constraint, consumers need to hold
money within the period to make consumption expenditures:
t t C M ‡   (5)
We assume that the market for bonds and money takes place
before the market for goods, so it is not necessary for consumers
to hold money between periods. The timing in our cash-in-advance
constraint resembles that in Lucas (1980), where bonds can be
exchanged for money balances for consumption within each period.
In contrast, in Svensson’s (1983) version of the cash-in-advance
constraint, the market for goods precedes the market for bonds,
so consumers need to hold money balances between periods.
5
We further assume that firms and the government pay wages at
the beginning of the period, before the market for bonds takes
place. Within our intra-period timing of events, consumers can
earn interest it on both initial bond holdings Bt-1 and on current
income, by holding bonds throughout the period, whereas, by the
cash-in-advance constraint, they forgo interest on cash holdings
needed to make consumption expenditures during the period. In
this sense, our model in discrete time resembles the cash-in-
advance model in continuous time of Calvo (1986).10
Both firms and the government receive a cash advance from
the Central Bank at the beginning of each period in order to pay
wages in advance, which they repay with interest it at the end of
each period. In competitive equilibrium, the real wage (in both












The per period budget constraint for the representative
consumer is that total nominal income, Yt=wt(lct+lgt), plus
interest earned on initial bond holdings and current income, net
of cash holdings, equals consumption expenditure, Ct=ptct, plus
financial asset accumulation:  t t t t t t t B C M Y B i Y D + = - + + - ) ( 1 . With no
initial asset holdings, the inter-temporal budget constraint
implies that the present value of consumption plus the cost of
holding money will equal total wealth W, i.e. the present
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5 The differences between these two timings are discussed in
Nicolini (1997), and in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
6 Financial costs affect the real wage, since in a competitive
equilibrium profits pctlt-(1+it)wtlt must be zero.
7 By non-satiation, no assets are left over at the end of t=2.11
The interest earnings consumers lose by holding on to cash
accrues to the Central Bank.
  These seignorage revenues, given by
Tt=itMt, are transferred back to the government.
8 Devaluation,
through the nominal rate of interest, acts as a tax on
consumption.
9 Besides revenues Tt, debt Dt can be incurred to pay
for public expenditure, and to serve outstanding debt from the
previous period. Taking into account financial costs, government
spending in nominal terms is
  gt t t t l w i G ) 1 ( + = . The per-period
government budget constraint is  1 - + = D + t t t t t D i G D T . The
intertemporal budget constraint implies that the present value of
taxes equals the present value of government expenditure, G
(assuming initial debt is zero).
10
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Optimal consumption decisions
The consumer maximizes utility subject to the cash-in-
advance and wealth constraints.
11 Replacing constraint (5) in
(7), the problem of the consumer can be written as:
                    
8 This is akin to the Federal Reserve Board´s measurement of
seignorage as the nominal interest rate payments on government
bonds avoided by the issue of non-interest bearing liabilities.
9 Devaluation acts as a consumption tax, rather than an income
tax, since interest earnings are not taxed (cf. discussion in
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, chapter 3).
10 Final debt is zero in equilibrium, due to non-satiation.
11 The cash in advance constraint will be binding if interest
rates are positive in equilibrium, which will be the case here.12
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By the first-order conditions for consumption, the effective
price of consumption each period is the price in dollars
augmented by the nominal interest rate, as in Calvo (1986).
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*, the time path of consumption depends on the












































Labor can be employed by firms, or by the government. The
labor market clears when the fixed supply equals demand.
2 , 1 , = + = t for l l l gt ct (12)
Production of the public good must equal demand g each
period. The consumption good is tradable, so the present value of
consumption and production must be equal.
12
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12 By Walras’ law, the overall equality between demand and supply
of tradables follows from the rest of the system.13
If the government were a social planner that could implement
a solution directly, it would maximize consumer’s utility,
subject to constraints (12) and (13).
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Since d=r*, the first order conditions for consumption imply
that consumption smoothing is Pareto optimal.
2 , 1 ,













However, the government cannot impose the Pareto solution
directly; it must solve the Ramsey problem of maximizing consumer
utility subject to feasibility constraints (12) and (13) and
first order conditions (10). Comparing (15) to first order
conditions (10) which consumers face in the market, it becomes
obvious that the Pareto optimum can be implemented with a
constant rate of interest, and hence a constant rate of
devaluation (given that r* is constant). Thus, the Ramsey
solution with constant tax rates tt”it/(1+it) is Pareto optimal.
13
                    
13 The fact that the Pareto solution is implementable implies
that, though exchange rate policy is discretionary, there is no
time inconsistency problem. The optimal policy is consistent with
the Barro (1979) result that tax smoothing is optimal under
distortionary taxation (since the consumption tax is
distortionary, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this
model). These results can also be derived maximizing the indirect
utility function, subject to the government budget constraint.
The crucial point for the argument in the text is that there14




opt) is determined by the ratio of the





































Since g is positive, tax rates and interest rates are
positive in equilibrium. A higher level of government
productivity, indicated by a larger g , frees up labor for
private production, and reduces the optimal tax rate t
opt.
Trade-off between current and future devaluation
Though tax-smoothing is optimal from a welfare perspective,
the government can lower current devaluation incurring debt.
Later, it must resort to a higher devaluation to pay off that
additional debt, as in the Sargent-Wallace trade-off between
present and future inflation. To express future tax rates as a
function of current tax rates, we use the identities tt”it/(1+it),
and (1+i1)/(1+i2)”(1-t2)/(1-t1).
14
                                                                 
exist some level of taxes to implement the Pareto optimal first
period consumption (in this case, a flat level of taxes).
14 By (5), (7) and (11), current consumption is a function of W
and interest rates; by (8) and (11), current consumption is a
function of G and interest rates. Equating both expressions, the
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For CRRA r‡1, a strict trade-off between current taxes t1 
and future taxes t2, for values of t1£G/W, can be established
(Lemma 1 in Appendix). Figure 1 shows the trade-off between
current and future taxes: with log utility (CRRA r=1), there is a
linear trade-off, while in the neighborhood of t
opt the
relationship is concave for r>1.
Figure 1.
By Lemma 1, for t1£G/W future taxes rise as current taxes
fall, so relative future taxes rise; by first order condition
(11), current consumption rises in relation to future
consumption; because the resource constraint of the economy is
given by W-G, a constant, current consumption also increases in
absolute terms. This one-to-one relationship between current
taxes and current consumption allows us to cast the trade-off in
terms of present and future consumption rather than present and
future tax rates, which simplifies the signaling game in Section
Three: for all values of r, it is possible to derive from
equations (5), (7), (8) and (13) a linear trade-off between
current and future consumption.
1
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The purpose of this Section was to establish the trade-off
between first and second period devaluation, and the
corresponding trade-off between first and second period
consumption. In the following Section, we will show how, under
incomplete information, an opportunistic incumbent can exploit
this trade-off to appear more competent, and increase its chances
of reelection.
III. The political model: competence and opportunism
We introduce elections, voters, and politicians under
asymmetric information. Voters ignore both the degree of
competence and the degree of opportunism of incumbent
governments. We work with a two period model, where elections are
held at the end of the first period, and voters vote according to
how qualified incumbents are at delivering public goods.
15
The incumbents can be either competent (i=c) or incompetent
(i=nc), as in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), to handle future issues.
A competent government needs less employment to produce a given
amount of the public good in the second period.
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We assume that future competency is not linked to current
competency. The idea is that different periods have different
                    
15 The two period setup is adopted to focus on the behavior
around elections. The results are qualitatively similar if the
time horizon is extended. However, distortionary behavior becomes
more likely as the number of periods increases, because the17
salient issues that the incumbent may be more or less qualified
to handle. For example, during the Reagan-Carter campaign the
salient issue was the ability to manage an international crisis,
while during the Bush-Clinton campaign, the defining issue was
clearly the domestic economy. We simply assume that the incumbent
has an informational advantage regarding its competence to face
the salient issue of the next presidential period, g2
i, which may
be different from the current one. Thus, voters observe current




Incumbents can also differ in their opportunism, j=o,no,
which in our model is reflected by how much an incumbent values
sticking to power, beyond any commitment towards public welfare.
Let zt=1 when candidate j is incumbent, and zt=0 when not. While
a non-opportunistic incumbent has the same CRRA utility function
as the representative consumer, an opportunistic incumbent
derives additional pleasure K from holding office,
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political stakes rise, reflecting the option value of future
reelections.
16 If current competency were relevant for future competency,
current government debt would have to be unobservable, as in
Stein and Streb (1998), in order to preserve the informational
asymmetry.18
A justification for this assumption of heterogeneity
regarding opportunism can be found in Tufte (1978). He presents
quotes from politicians and economic advisors that show that,
while some politicians would be willing to go to great lengths in
order to be reelected, others won’t. Nixon, for example, is
portrayed as a politician who is well aware of the importance of
manipulating the economy in order to win elections, particularly
after losing the 1960 election by a narrow margin. Gerald Ford,
in contrast, appears to have been non-opportunistic. Tufte
reports that, shortly before the 1976 presidential elections,
William Seidman, a top economic advisor to Ford, said:
“I think Mr. Ford’s chances of reelection are very
good. As for the economic lull, we considered the
use of stimulus to make sure we didn’t have a low
third quarter, but the president didn’t want
anything to do with a short-term view”.
The timing of the game is as follows. Each period, voters
form their priors about the candidate’s types. Nature then endows
candidates with a set of characteristics, which is private
information. The government sets taxes, and consumers decide the
level of consumption. At the end of the first period, elections
are held.
The voters priors about candidates are that they are
competent with probability q (incompetent with probability 1-q)
and opportunistic with probability s (non-opportunistic with
probability 1-s).19
The signaling game is carried out in terms of consumption
levels, taking advantage of the simple linear trade-off between
current and future consumption implied by tax rates. This puts
the implications of Calvo (1986) in a political economy setting:
lower devaluation leads to a consumption boom that can help the
government get reelected.
17 By the informational asymmetries,
voters may not know if it is a temporary boom (which would be the
case if the devaluation rate is unsustainable) or a permanent
improvement.
After the benchmark case of complete information, incomplete
information on competency is analyzed. We then concentrate on the
consequences of incomplete information on both the incumbent’s
competency and opportunism.
Complete information
For given levels of resources W-Gi available under i=c,nc,
second period decisions are trivial: to close the budget,
c2
i=c2
i(c1) depends on whether second-period incumbent is
competent or not (i=nc,c).
In the first period, under complete information the
incumbent cannot affect its chances of reelection. The best it
can do is pick the optimal policy, for a given probability q that
second period incumbent is competent: the marginal utility of
                    
17 In Calvo (1986), the consumption boom in exchange rate-based
stabilizations arises from the temporary character of the
reduction in the rate of devaluation.20
consumption today must equal the expected utility of consumption
tomorrow.
18
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nc c ¢ - + ¢ = ¢ q q  (21)
Optimal first period consumption is increasing in the
probability q that future competency is high .
19  Indirect utility
of voters is also increasing in  q.  For this reason, optimizing
voters reelect an incumbent when the conditional probability q
that it is competent is larger than q, which is the probability
that the opponent will be competent. Under complete information
voters reelect competent incumbents, since q=1, but replace
incompetents, since the probability of high future competency
rises from  q=0 to q=q with an opposition candidate.
An incumbent that is competent to handle future issues  can
assure high current consumption, which we denote c1
c. An
incumbent that is incompetent will not be reelected: denote
consumption c1
m, the optimum given the probability q=q that the
second period replacement may be competent. This consumption is
above c1
nc, the first period consumption that would obtain if the
incumbent were incompetent to handle future issues, and it could
                    
18 To implement the Pareto solution, taxes must be set at a level
that leads to first period consumption determined by (21).
19 An increased probability that the second period incumbent is
competent, i.e. a greater q,  increases the probability of the
high consumption state in the second period. By decreasing21
not be replaced by elections (in which case q=0). First period
consumption as a function of q  is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Working by backward induction, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium is separating: elections help sort out better
candidates for the job of government.
One-dimensional incomplete information
The key assumption is that competency is not directly
observable. However, the degree of opportunism, K, is known to be
high. We analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ensuing
signaling game. The incumbent decides the level of current taxes,
and hence consumption, taking into account voter reactions.
In a separating equilibrium, consumption will be either low
or high. The high level is that signal c1
s only a competent
incumbent is willing to send. This signal guarantees reelection,
since voters infer q=1. For out of equilibrium values of
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To find the actual c1
s, the signaling game can be couched in
terms of the gains and costs, for the different types of
incumbents, of sending c1
s.
                                                                 
marginal utility of consumption, optimal consumption must rise in
the first period.22
Figure 3.
The gain G is the utility K of being in office in the second
period. The cost C of signaling depends on the incumbent’s type:
it is the difference between indirect utility V at c1
m, when the
incumbent does not signal and is not reelected, and at c1
s, when
it signals and is reelected.
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The costs are broken down into the two terms in brackets,
the fixed and variable components. The fixed component is
evaluated at the optimal intertemporal consumption for each type
of incumbent. For the case of an incompetent incumbent (i=nc), it
is a fixed cost for signal c1
s=c1
nc: the probability a competent
is in office in the second period falls from q to 0. For a
competent incumbent (i=c), it is a fixed benefit for signal
c1
s=c1
c: the probability a competent is in office in the second
period jumps from q to 1. The variable component is due to the
distortion in the optimal time profile of consumption.
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By the concavity of the utility function, marginal costs of
i=nc are positive for c1
s>c1
nc, so its cost function is increasing
beyond this point, while in the case of i=c they are positive for
c1
s>c1
c. Over the relevant range of signals c1
s‡c1
c, an23






c‰i=c), and by (24) the slope of the
cost function for the incompetent is steeper than that for a
competent, which ensures that the cost curves do not cross.
If the cost for an incompetent of sending the signal c1
c
were larger than the gain K from reelection, c1
s=c1
c would become
the separating signal and consumption would be constant over





Proposition 1: with incomplete information on competency,
and high opportunism, there is always a separating equilibrium,
where a competent incumbent picks c1
s>c1
c and an incompetent
incumbent picks c1
m.
A pooling equilibrium can be ruled out using equilibrium
dominance arguments, as in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff
(1990), applying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion to restrict
out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
21
                    
20 At the point where an incompetent is just indifferent between
sending the signal or not, we assume it does not signal. A
competent, however, will wish to signal, since it has the same
gain but lower costs at that point.
21There is an interior solution with a separating equilibrium
because marginal utility tends to infinity as period two
consumption goes to zero, so the marginal cost of signaling
becomes prohibitive for incompetent incumbent (likewise, there is
an interior solution in taxes, since c2ﬁ0 as t2ﬁ1).24
Two-dimensional incomplete information
If the uncertainty of voters is not only about the
incumbent’s competency, but also about its opportunism, the
nature of the game changes. We assume there can be two levels of
opportunism: opportunistic incumbents with k=K, large enough to
mimic the signal c1
c necessary for reelection; and non-
opportunistic incumbent with k=0 that are not willing to distort
economic policy to be reelected. This setup leads to a partially
pooling equilibrium. The problem is represented in Table 1.
The crucial issue for the partially pooling equilibrium is
quite intuitive: the non-opportunistic, incompetent, incumbent
always picks c1
m (and loses the election). A high level of
consumption c1
c can thus work as an informative signal.













From the viewpoint of voters, the conditional probability
that the incumbent is competent, if c1
c is observed, is
q=q/(q+(1-q)s). As long as s<1, this probability will be higher
than q, the probability that somebody elected at random is
competent, since a non-opportunistic incompetent never sends that
signal. Voters that maximize expected utility thus reelect an
incumbent that delivers c1
c, and replace an incumbent with c1
m.
Given this behavior of voters, competent governments have no
incentive to signal with a higher level of consumption, because
it does not increase their chances of reelection and it distorts
the optimal time profile of consumption. To put it differently,
incumbents don’t need to prove their competence. They just need
to show that the probability that they are competent is greater
than the probability q that a replacement is competent. The
signal c1
c is enough to achieve that goal.
Proposition 2: with incomplete information on competency and
opportunism, there is a partially pooling equilibrium. A non-
opportunistic incompetent picks c1
m. A competent, and a highly
opportunistic incompetent, pick c1
c.
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The incumbent that distorts economic policy is not the
competent, as in the conventional story, but rather the
incompetent who tries to masquerade as a competent incumbent.
                    
22 If no one were highly opportunistic, there would be a
separating equilibrium, and no political budget cycle.26
Continuum of types of opportunism
The results derived before do not depend on the existence of
a non-opportunistic incumbent. The key point is that politicians
can differ in their degree of opportunism, and hence in the
extremes to which they are willing to go to get reelected.
Suppose the types of opportunism are uniformly distributed
between k and K, k˛[k,K]. Let k* be the level of opportunism
that leads exactly to separating signal c1
s=c1
c, under incomplete
information on the degree of competency, and let 0£k<k*<K.
Propositions 1 and 2 change as follows:
Proposition 3: With asymmetric information on competency,
but knowledge of opportunism k, the separating signal for
competent is c1
s=c1
c when k£k*, and c1
s>c1
c when k>k*. An
incompetent always picks c1
m.
Proposition 4: With asymmetric information on competency and
opportunism, a competent always pick c1
c. An incompetent with
type k>k* mimics c1
c, while an incompetent with k£k* picks c1
m.
Note that by Proposition 3 there is a distortion in the
separating equilibrium when opportunism is known to be high, i.e.
k>k*. By Proposition 4, there is a probability 1-s=k*/K>0 that an
incompetent, opportunistic incumbent will send a distortionary
signal in the partially pooling equilibrium. In both cases,
political budget cycles arise with positive probability.27
IV. Empirical implications of the model
In this Section, we compare the implications of the
different information structures for the behavior of exchange
rates around elections, and confront the predictions to empirical
evidence on devaluations taken from the Latin-American
experience.
Political cycles implied by asymmetric information
Under complete information, there is no political budget
cycle. A competent incumbent is reelected, smoothing taxes and
setting a constant rate of devaluation. An incompetent incumbent
loses the elections, setting the devaluation rate optimally given
that it will be replaced by a competent with probability q and by
an incompetent with probability (1-q): in expected value, there
is no distortion before elections.
In contrast, the incomplete information setups deliver
electoral cycles. With a continuum of types of opportunism, its
occurrence depends on the proportion s of incumbents with high
opportunism (i.e., above the critical k* defined in Section
Three) and the proportion q of incumbents with high competency.
Under incomplete information about competence only, the
incompetent always chooses high devaluation and loses the
elections for sure. The competent incumbent tilts the optimal
time profile of devaluation, downwards in the present and upwards28
in the future, with probability qs. Hence, an electoral
devaluation cycle is possible.
Under incomplete information about competency and
opportunism, an incompetent government that is not very
opportunistic chooses a high devaluation and loses elections. A
competent incumbent smoothes the devaluation rate and is
reelected. An very opportunistic, incompetent, incumbent mimics
the competent to win the election, so a partially pooling
equilibrium emerges. A tilt in the optimal time profile of
devaluation again takes place, with probability (1-q)s.
Obviously, although in the model competence is observed ex-
post, empirically it is not easy to distinguish either the degree
of competence or of opportunism. Distinguishing empirically
between the implications of both informational setups is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, the model does suggest an
important difference between the two informational setups: while
one dimensional informational asymmetry implies that there are no
surprises after elections (only competent incumbents are
reelected), two dimensional information asymmetry implies there
can be surprises after elections (the reelected incumbent can be
competent or incompetent).
In spite of these differences, both setups produce similar
implications with regard to one important point: they both imply
that when governments manipulate the exchange rate, they29
manipulate it in the same direction as the episodes that motivate
our study: postponement of devaluations until after elections.
This is done by a highly opportunistic competent, if the level of
opportunism is common knowledge, and by a highly opportunistic
incompetent, if the level of opportunism is private information.
The evidence
Having discussed the empirical implications of the model, we
now turn to some new evidence, drawn from the experience of 26
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarding the
pattern of exchange rates around elections.
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This evidence is meant to complement the work of others such
as Klein and Marion (1994) and Gavin and Perotti (1997). Klein
and Marion studied the abandonment of pegs. Therefore, they do
not capture changes in the rate of crawl of the exchange rate,
which is one of the ways in which devaluations may be delayed.
Gavin and Perotti focus only on regime switches from fixed to
flexible. Therefore, they disregard episodes of step
devaluations. Our methodology is intended to encompass all
possible ways in which delayed devaluations may occur.
The sample period is 1960 to 1994, and the list of countries
included in the sample is presented in the Appendix. Data on
nominal exchange rates is taken from the International Finance
Statistics of the IMF. Data on election dates is based on the30
“Enciclopedia Electoral Latinoamericana y del Caribe”,
coordinated by Nohlen (1993), and on the Lijphart Elections
Archive in the World Wide Web.
The methodology we use is very simple. We pull together all
elections in Latin America and the Caribbean over the sample
period (there are 242 of them, counting both presidential and
parliamentary elections). We consider a 19-month window centered
around each election. For each episode, month 0 corresponds to
the month of the election, month –1 to the month prior to the
election, and so on. We then average, for each of the 19 months
in the window (-9 through 9), the rate of nominal depreciation
across all episodes. The average nominal rate of depreciation,
month by month, is presented in Figure 4. In order to lessen the
effects of outliers, we worked with geometric averages rather
than arithmetic averages.
Figure 4
The pattern in the figure is striking, and provides strong
support to the hypothesis that devaluations are delayed until
after elections. In months 2, 3 and 4 after an election, the
average rate of nominal depreciation is 2 percentage points
higher than it is for other months, and the average rate of
                                                                 
23 The empirical evidence draws from joint work with Piero
Ghezzi.31
depreciation is more than doubled. The larger effect occurs two
months after the election.
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The pattern is even stronger when only presidential
elections are considered, as shown in figure 5. In this case, the
average rate of nominal depreciation in month 2 reaches 7%,
around 4.5 percentage points higher than in other months. The
behavior of the nominal exchange rate around parliamentary (non-




We presented a rational political budget cycle model for an
open economy, where elections play a key role in explaining the
timing of movements in nominal exchange rates. To the standard
setup of this class of models, which introduces incomplete
information regarding the competence of the government, we added
a twist: incomplete information regarding the degree to which the
incumbent is opportunistic. As a result, we obtained a partially
pooling equilibrium where the opportunistic incompetent deviates
                    
24 Ghezzi, Frieden and Stein (1998) distinguish between delaying
devaluations until after elections, or until after government
changes. They find that the fact that devaluations occur 2-4
months after elections is a reflection of the fact that the lag
between the election and the change in government is in most
cases between 1 and three months. This suggests that while in
some cases, such as Mexico pre-1994, the outgoing administration
implemented the devaluation after the party won the elections, in32
from optimal policy, rather than the standard separating
equilibrium where the competent deviates to signal its
competence. In the run-up to an election, an incompetent,
opportunistic government can be tempted to reduce the rate of
devaluation, increasing it after the elections take place.
In addition, we have provided new evidence on the effect of
elections on the timing of devaluations. The findings are
consistent with the main implication of our theoretical model:
the rate of devaluation is significantly higher in the months
following an election, as compared to the months preceding it.
The fact that governments tend to postpone devaluations
until after elections can also be used to explain why exchange
rates can become over-valued before elections. However, this
implication cannot be derived in a one good economy, so the
distinction between tradables and non-tradables must be
introduced to address this issue. We intend to do this in a
future paper.
Appendix
Lemma 1: For CRRA r‡1, there exists a strict trade-off between
current taxes t1  and future taxes t2, for values of t1£G/W.
Proof: differentiating (17),
                                                                 
most cases the incumbent does not want to endure the political
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When t2=t1, both tax rates equal t
opt=G/W, so the derivative
at that point equals –(1+r*)<0. If t1<G/W, the denominator is
positive; since 0£(1-1/r)£1, and 1-t1‡G/W-t1, 1-t1‡(G/W-t1)(1-1/r),
the numerator is negative. Note that t2 cannot exceed one, so a
lower bound on t1 exists. For the trade-off to continue to hold
for t1<0, an additional assumption is necessary to avoid negative
interest rates being used to speculate and accumulate cash, which
leads to a liquidity trap; it suffices to assume that cash
balances outstanding at the end of the first period are worthless
in the second period, since once the “old currency” can only be
used to consume more in the first period, the cash in advance
constraint will also be binding for negative interest rates.
List of countries in elections sample: Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.34
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